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Collecting to the Core — U.S. Presidential Campaigns
by Jeremy Darrington  (Politics Librarian, Princeton University Library; Political Science Editor, Resources for College 
Libraries)  <jdarring@princeton.edu>
Column Editor:  Anne Doherty  (Resources for College Libraries Project Editor, CHOICE/ACRL)  <adoherty@ala-choice.org>
Column Editor’s Note:  The “Collecting 
to the Core” column highlights monographic 
works that are essential to the academic li-
brary within a particular discipline, inspired 
by the Resources for College Libraries bib-
liography (online at http://www.rclweb.net). 
In each essay, subject specialists introduce 
and explain the classic titles and topics that 
continue to remain relevant to the undergrad-
uate curriculum and library collection.  Dis-
ciplinary trends may shift, but some classics 
never go out of style. — AD
In the early 1940s, Paul Lazarsfeld and several colleagues at Columbia University embarked on a series of landmark studies to 
investigate how people decide whom to vote 
for in U.S. presidential elections.  In contrast 
to the popular focus emphasizing political 
strategy and pivotal events, decisions, or gaffes 
along the campaign trail, Lazarsfeld conclud-
ed in The People’s Choice that while people 
hesitate and meditate and imagine that they 
decide rationally on the better road to take, it 
would have often been possible to predict at the 
outset what they would decide to do in the end. 
Knowing a few of their personal characteris-
tics, we can tell with fair certainty how they 
will finally vote: they join the fold to which 
they belong…a person thinks, politically, as 
he is, socially.  Social characteristics determine 
political preference.1
In the decades following, numerous other 
research studies confirmed Lazarsfeld’s 
conclusion that voters’ sociodemographic pre-
dispositions, especially partisan identification, 
strongly condition their vote choice. 
However, Lazarsfeld’s view that voters 
merely “imagine that they decide rationally” 
was too strong.  As V. O. Key countered in The 
Responsible Electorate, “voters are not fools…
the electorate behaves about as rationally and 
responsibly as we should expect, given the 
clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the 
character of the information available to it.”2 
This insight — that voters are rational but op-
erate in an environment of limited information 
— led Key to an important intuition:  voters 
treat elections as referenda on the incumbent 
party’s policies and performance.  “As voters 
mark their ballots they may have in their minds 
impressions of the last TV political spectacular 
of the campaign, but, more important, they 
have in their minds recollections of their ex-
periences of the past four years.”3  Later work 
made it clear that voters give particular weight 
to the performance of the national economy in 
these retrospective evaluations.4
But why should voters care about what 
happened in the past rather than evaluating 
candidates on the merits of their proposed pol-
icies and plans?  The answer, Samuel Popkin 
argued in The Reasoning Voter, is that voters 
engage in “low-information rationality” when 
voting.  Because voters have little detailed 
knowledge about politics and policies “and a 
limited understanding of how governmental 
actions are connected to consequences of 
immediate concern to them,” they rely on in-
formation shortcuts to help them make voting 
decisions.5  Since voters have difficulty antic-
ipating the effects of proposed policies or how 
leaders will actually govern once elected, they 
use shortcuts like party identification and eval-
uations of the incumbent party’s management 
of the economy to provide relevant information 
to fill in the gaps.
The reliance of voters on these cues to 
guide vote choices led to a recognition among 
political scientists that presidential elections 
could be predicted on the basis of these “fun-
damentals,” as they came to be known.  Indeed, 
by the early 1990s, scholars had developed 
forecasting models that, relying on a handful 
of indicators like partisan identification, recent 
GDP growth, and presidential approval, were 
able to predict the outcomes of presidential 
elections within a percentage point or 
two.6-7 The natural conclusion 
these strands of research 
pointed to was the “mini-
mal effects” thesis of U.S. 
presidential campaigns:  if 
elections are so predict-
able, then campaigns must 
not matter all that much.
But that conclusion didn’t 
sit well with many researchers. 
After all, if campaigns don’t re-
ally matter, how do we explain the inordinate 
amount of time, attention, effort, and money 
poured into them (more than $2.3 billion on the 
2012 presidential race alone)?8  One answer is 
that campaigns are not ineffective, just equally 
effective. In our high-stakes, two-party system, 
the effects of two well-matched, well-funded 
campaigns largely cancel each other out.  Like a 
game of tug-of-war, if one side lets go, the other 
side easily wins.  “But of course the candidates 
do not let go and that makes it hard to see that 
their efforts are making a difference.”9
Another answer, it turns out, is to reframe 
the question.  Instead of asking, “Do campaigns 
matter?” researchers decided to ask, “When 
and in what ways do campaigns matter?”  This 
question has generated a large body of research, 
establishing that campaigns do indeed matter. 
Several key ideas have emerged from this 
recent work.
First, scholars agree that the “fundamen-
tals,” those “national conditions that set the 
stage for the campaign” — such as the state of 
the economy, the balance of partisan leanings, 
and presidential approval — are major, but not 
absolute, determinants of voter choice.10  Draw-
ing on a rolling survey of over 57,000 voters 
(most nationally representative surveys have 
fewer than 3,000 respondents), Kate Kenski 
and her colleagues were able to test a host of 
different potential influences on voters’ choices 
for president in 2008.  In The Obama Victory: 
How Media, Money, and Message Shaped 
the 2008 Election, their analysis shows that 
fundamentals account for about 80 percent of 
the variance in voter’s choice of candidate.11 
That’s quite significant, but it leaves room for 
influence, and in close elections a little bit of 
influence can make all the difference.  And 
anyway, to state the obvious, candidates still 
have to compete to win.  Even though “the 
outcome can typically be foreseen from the 
fundamentals of the campaign…surprises are 
possible….Just as in baseball, the season must 
be played out to determine who wins.”12
Second, recent work has made clear 
that campaigns fulfill an important role in 
enabling voter learning.  Since most voters 
have limited political knowledge and inter-
est, campaign events and messaging serve 
to drum up interest in politics and 
enlighten voters about the 
character, competence, 
and policy positions of 
candidates.  As Popkin 
notes, “campaign” is a 
military term and an apt 
metaphor, because candi-
dates “must engage their 
political opponents in a 
series of battles conduct-
ed in full view of their 
countrymen, who will 
judge each contest.  To arouse public opinion 
and generate support for their cause, they must 
defend old policies, sell new policies, and justi-
fy their rule.”13  And like other spectator sports, 
these public battles activate latent loyalties and 
mobilize support, effectively sorting voters into 
competing teams rooting for their champion.
This metaphor is also useful for highlight-
ing two related points that run against common-
ly held beliefs about campaigns.  First, many 
people deplore the mudslinging and negative 
attacks so ubiquitous to campaigning.  How-
ever, as John Geer argues in his In Defense 
of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Cam-
paigns, negativity in campaigns is a vital part 
of the democratic process.14  Candidates have 
an incentive to expose shortcomings in their 
opponents’ character, competence, and policies 
and to respond to attacks against them in turn. 
This competitive dynamic increases the avail-
ability and quality of information available to 
voters (for example, most candidates rarely 
release tax returns without being challenged 
to do so).  To extend the battle metaphor, you 
can’t win a boxing match without throwing a 
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punch.  Furthermore, how you fight can be just 
as informative — if you throw a lot of punches 
below the belt, you may get away with it, but 
you risk turning the crowd against you. 
Another common belief is to proclaim this 
or that event (say, Romney’s 47 percent com-
ment or Obama’s performance in the first pres-
idential debate in 2012) to be a “game-chang-
er.”  In The Timeline of Presidential Elections: 
How Campaigns Do (and Do Not) Matter, 
Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien 
analyze all the national presidential election 
polls from 1952 to 2008 (more than 2000 of 
them) to determine how voter preferences 
evolve over the timeline of the presidential 
campaign.  They find that vote choice slowly 
coalesces throughout the election year.  While 
political ads and other campaign events may 
affect voters’ candidate preferences, most of 
the effects disappear quickly without leaving 
a trace, like ripples from a pebble tossed into 
a river.  There are two exceptions, though. 
The first involves the national nominating 
conventions, which are major spectacles that 
engage and inform large numbers of voters, 
help activate and cement latent party loyalties, 
and mobilize supporters.  The other exception 
is short-term movements of opinion in the final 
two weeks of the campaign that affect the vote 
before their effect wears off.  But the scope 
for such last-minute movements is limited, 
“as remarkably few voters change their minds 
over the course of the campaign.”15  Again the 
battle metaphor is instructive — most events of 
the campaign are glancing blows, not knockout 
punches, but sometimes landing a few glancing 
blows at the end of a match can be enough to 
have it called in your favor.
The third major lesson from the recent cam-
paign literature is that the messages campaigns 
choose to focus on make a difference.  In The 
Message Matters: The Economy and Presi-
dential Campaigns, Lynn Vavreck applies 
the lessons of “low-information rationality” to 
campaign strategy.16  In choosing a candidate to 
match their preferred positions on issues, voters 
face uncertainty about the relative importance 
of different policies, about where a candidate 
stands on an issue, and about how certain 
they are that the candidate actually holds the 
position he or she professes.  Candidates thus 
engage in three distinct behaviors that inform 
voters.  By talking repeatedly about certain 
issues (a process called priming), candidates 
attempt to focus the agenda of elections onto 
issues favorable to them.  They also attempt 
to persuade voters that they hold specific 
positions — or that their opponents do — and 
to clarify their positions on important issues, 
primarily the economy (which is the best issue 
because it’s always clear which side to be on 
— “everyone prefers prosperity to decline”).17 
Ultimately, this leads to two dominant strat-
egies for candidates, depending on whether 
the fundamentals favor them or not—either 
they run a clarifying campaign to emphasize 
“their role in fostering the good economic 
times or their lack of a role in bringing about 
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bad times” or they run an insurgent campaign, 
which attempts to refocus the election off the 
economy and onto a popular issue that “directly 
exploit[s] the weaknesses or constraints of 
their opponents.”  In other words, if you can’t 
use “it’s the economy stupid,” then you’d 
better change the subject.  Testing her theory 
against the fifteen presidential elections from 
1952 to 2008, Vavreck concludes that the 
“impressive relationship between citizens and 
national economic context can be intensified if 
candidates choose to talk about the economy 
in their campaigns,” but “candidates’ rhetoric 
about other issues can drive out the importance 
of the economy if they choose the right issue. 
The structural conditions matter, but they can 
be overcome.”18
Many questions remain about precisely in 
what ways and for whom campaigns matter. 
For example, while there’s general agreement 
that a small segment of the population in any 
given election can be swayed from one side 
to the other (perhaps as much as 20 percent, 
but likely less than 10 percent), there’s much 
disagreement about which voters are most 
persuadable.  Most of the literature has argued, 
following Lazarsfeld, that voters with the least 
political knowledge and interest are the most 
persuadable, since they can benefit the most 
from the informational effects of campaigns. 
However, others have argued that campaigns 
frequently use “wedge” issues to try to target 
and win over knowledgeable partisans who 
have strong preferences on an issue that diverg-
es from their party’s candidate (for example, 
in 2004 Democrats tried to use the issue of 
stem cell research to attract the votes of Re-
publicans who disagreed with Bush’s stance 
against it).19  Another question of increasing 
relevance to campaign researchers concerns 
the issue of “microtargeting” — the ability of 
campaigns to leverage technology and vast 
databases of information on voters to send 
messages and appeals finely tuned to various 
constituencies, say 45 to 55-year-old white, 
female, college-educated Democrats making 
more than $120,000 a year in Princeton, New 
Jersey.  There is much we don’t know about 
how these groups are selected, what kinds of 
messages are targeted to them, and how effec-
tive the appeals are.
But with all that we know (or don’t know) 
about campaigns, perhaps one lesson is most 
worth remembering in this election season: 
“the people’s verdict can be no more than a 
selective reflection from among the alternatives 
and outlooks presented to them….If the people 
can choose only from among rascals, they are 
certain to choose a rascal.”20  
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digital skills as well as provide comfortable 
reading and working spaces.  A couple 
of points that specifically interested me. 
Americans are divided on a fundamental 
question about how books should be treated 
at libraries: 24% support the idea of moving 
books and stacks in order to make way for 
more community- and tech-oriented spaces, 
while 31% say libraries should not move the 
books to create such spaces.  About four-in-ten 
think libraries should maybe consider doing so.
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